

USIB - D-64.6/61 2 February 1976 Limited Distribution

UNITED

STATES

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BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT

: CCPC Study on Indian Ocean Area

Intelligence Collection

REFERENCES

a. USIB-D-64.6/53, 31 July 1972, limited

distribution

b. USIB-M-627, 14 September 1972, Secretary's Note No. 9

- 1. The enclosed memorandum from the Acting Chairman, Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC), and its attached study on the subject is forwarded for USIB consideration. This study is an update of the 1972 CCPC Study on Indian Ocean Area Intelligence Collection (reference a.) and examines current collection activities, determines what improvements in intelligence coverage have been achieved and what additional measures should be undertaken. The CCPC recommends that the USIB:
 - a. Note the attached Back-up Study and Special Annex; and
 - b. Approve the Conclusions (Section III, p.6) and Recommendations (Section IV, p.7).

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USIB-D-64.6/61 2 February 1976 Limited Distribution 2. It is planned to schedule this subject on a USIB agenda for Board consideration at an early date. Executive Secretary Enclosure		TOP SE	CR ET	<u>.</u>		
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Enclosure USIB-D-64.6/61

CRITICAL COLLECTION PROBLEMS COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

12 January 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: CCPC Study on Indian Ocean Area Intelligence Collection

- 1. The attached Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC) Study is an update of the 1972 CCPC Indian Ocean Area Intelligence Collection Study. This Study examines current collection activities, determines what improvements in intelligence coverage have been achieved and what additional measures should be undertaken.
- 2. The Study is submitted in two parts: (a) a covering report containing the highlights of the intelligence activities against Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean area and general conclusions concerning them; and (b) a Back-up Study. (A Special Annex is forwarded in separate channels.)

4. It is recommended that the USIB:

- a. Note the attached Back-up Study and Special Annex; and
- b. Approve the Conclusions (Section III, p. 6) and Recommendations (Section IV

Eloise R. Page Acting Chairman

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
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Critical Collection
Problems Committee

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Indian Ocean Area Intelligence Collection



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CCPC STUDY ON INDIAN OCEAN AREA INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

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I. INTRODUCTION

- A. The Critical Collection Problems Committee was requested to update its 1972 Indian Ocean Area Intelligence Collection Study to include: (1) a resurvey of the situation in the Indian Ocean area relative to Soviet presence and activities; (2) identification of community intelligence needs on this problem; (3) an examination of current collection activities; (4) determination of what improvements in intelligence coverage have been achieved; and (5) what, if any, additional measures should be undertaken. As in the previous study, the Indian Ocean area is defined to include the Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea, Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea.
- B. The back-up study presents an in-depth examination of this problem and is the basis of Section III—Conclusions and Recommendations.

A. The Soviets continue to use their naval forces and activities in the Indian Ocean to further their image as a global military power as well as to enhance their political image. During the past seven years, there has been a slow but steady increase in the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean area and this increase is expected to continue gradually over the next several years. The greatest progress by the Soviets has been made in their negotiations with some governments of the littoral countries for port and logistic facilities support, as exemplified in Somalia. U.S. interest in this area has generally expanded commensurate with the increase of Soviet naval activity in the area and as a result of growing U.S. awareness of the strategic potential of the Indian Ocean and heightened interest in the area's resources, especially oil from the Persian Gulf littoral countries.

B. Specific categories of U.S. information needs on Soviet Indian Ocean area activities remain the same as in 1972.

C. Although the overall U.S. capability to respond to the above intelligence information needs has improved substantially since 1972, it continues to be less than adequate. Some of this deficiency is expected to be lessened with the implementation of new and improved collection resources over the next few years. However, the inadequacy will continue as long as the Indian Ocean area continues to be assigned a low priority in the intelligence community.

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CCPC BACK-UP STUDY ON INDIAN OCEAN AREA INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

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
I. SITUATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA

A. General

The current and developing situation in the Indian Ocean area has been addressed February 1974, Implications of Reopening the Suez Canal; November 1974, Soviet Naval Policies and Programs; and in a response to National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) 199, 23 May 1974, "Indian Ocean Strategy." In addition, extracts have been included from CIA Director Colby's testimony to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Military Construction (1 August 1974) on the subject of Soviet Presence in the Indian Ocean, and from the U.S. Naval Intelligence Assessment of Soviet Naval Deployment to the Indian Ocean. The following is drawn largely from these documents.

B. Soviet Naval Activities in the Indian Ocean Area

- 1. The Soviet naval buildup and presence in the Indian Ocean area are intended in part to further the image of the USSR as a global military power able at least to hold its own with the United States and to limit the future role of China in the area. During the last seven years, the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean has grown slowly but steadily, enabling Moscow to buttress its image as a super power in the eyes of most littoral states. Soviet activity has been highly responsive to regional developments and to Western naval operations. The USSR responded to the Middle East war and the arrival of a U.S. carrier task group in late October 1973 by almost doubling the number of warships in the area. Although the Soviet naval combatant presence does not appear to be designed for local intervention, if there was no countervailing power, the Soviets might attempt to use military force in dealing with some of the littoral states.
- 2. The Soviets have thus far been employing naval forces in the Indian Ocean area primarily to gain politico-military image. Their forces deployed to this area make many "show the flag" port visits to demonstrate support for friendly and client regimes. The Soviet ships spend a large portion of their time at anchor. The pace of operations, however, has been gradually increasing during the past two years and is becoming more concentrated in the northwestern Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Soviet ships conduct limited exercises, engage in surveillance of Western forces, and sporadically patrol in the Straits of Hormuz and Bab El Mandeb. In addition, Soviet naval units in the Indian Ocean



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